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OPINION** 
______________ 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this class action, the parties reached a settlement that did not resolve attorneys’ 
fees.  After the parties briefed and argued the attorneys’ fees issues before the District 
Court, the Court awarded over $1 million in fees to class counsel, which was more than 
four times the lodestar calculation.  Because the District Court did not provide any 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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findings to support this enhanced award, we will vacate and remand.   
I 
Named Plaintiff Deborah Dungee filed this class action on behalf of herself and 
certain other individuals who had entered into contracts with Defendant Davison Design 
& Development, Inc. for invention promotion services.  Dungee’s suit included class 
claims against Davison for violations of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 
(“AIPA”) and for breach of contract.  A fee-shifting provision within the AIPA allows 
customers who are deemed injured under the statute to recover “reasonable costs and 
attorneys’ fees.”  35 U.S.C. § 297(b)(1). 
After the District Court denied Davison’s motion to dismiss Dungee’s original 
complaint, the parties mediated the case and reached a settlement agreement.  Although 
the parties agreed that Davison would pay class counsel’s fees, they could not agree on 
the proper amount, so Dungee submitted a motion for attorneys’ fees to the District 
Court.  Dungee sought $2 million in fees under a percentage-of-recovery calculation.  
Davison argued in response that the lodestar calculation method1 was more appropriate 
under the circumstances; the parties agreed that the base lodestar calculation amounted to 
$257,226.76.  The District Court held a class action settlement fairness hearing on July 
30, 2015, during which the parties argued the attorneys’ fees issues.   
On February 16, 2016, the District Court issued an order granting $1,118,936.40 
in attorneys’ fees to Dungee’s counsel.  The District Court reached this figure by 
                                              
1 The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours an attorney 
reasonably worked on a case by that attorney’s reasonable hourly billing rate.  In re Rite 
Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Feb. 25, 2005).   
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applying a 4.35 multiplier to enhance the base lodestar calculation.  The District Court 
explained its methodology in one paragraph within a footnote: 
Applying the lodestar method, the court first notes that based upon 
the class attorneys’ hourly rates, the fees amount to $257,226.76.  
While Davison argues that no multiplier should be used because this 
is a “tag-along case,” this ignores the substantial case law that 
applies multipliers. . . . Dungee asserts that the Third Circuit 
typically applies multipliers up to 15.6 with an average of 4.35. . . .; 
Bradburn Parent Teacher Store, Inc. v. 3M, 513 F. Supp. 2d 322, 
341 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  Following Dungee’s alternative 
recommendation, the court will adopt the average multiplier within 
the Third Circuit of 4.35 and impose a fee of $1,118,936.40.   
 
JA5a.  On February 24, 2016, the District Court entered an order approving the 
final settlement between the parties, which included the $1.1 million attorneys’ 
fees award.  Davison timely appealed the District Court’s attorneys’ fees decision 
to this Court.   
II2 
A 
 “There are two primary methods for calculating attorneys’ fees” awards in the 
class action context:  (1) the percentage-of-recovery method; and (2) the lodestar method.  
                                              
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
“We review the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion, 
‘which can occur if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper 
procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are 
clearly erroneous.’”  Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 299 (quoting In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 2001)).  “The standards employed calculating 
attorneys’ fees awards are legal questions subject to plenary review, but ‘[t]he amount of 
a fee award . . . is within the district court’s discretion so long as it employs correct 
standards and procedures and makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous.’”  Id. (quoting 
Pub. Int. Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1184 (3d Cir. 1995)).             
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Cendant Corp., 243 F.3d at 732 (footnote omitted).  As the District Court noted here, 
“[t]he percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in cases involving a common 
fund,” id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 
F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998)), whereas the lodestar method may be more appropriate 
where the nature of the settlement does not allow the court to determine the value of the 
settlement,  or where there is a statutory fee-shifting provision, Prudential, 148 F.3d at 
333. 
 A district court has discretion to determine which type of case the settlement most 
closely resembles and which calculation method to apply.  In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-
Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995).  Here, the 
District Court chose the lodestar method, reasoning that “the nature of the settlement 
ma[de] it difficult to make a precise calculation using the percentage of recovery 
method.”  JA5a.  Indeed, there was no established “common fund” from which a simple 
percentage could be taken, and the ultimate value of the settlement depended upon the 
number of claims made by former customers for cash and service vouchers.  
Accordingly, we see no error in the District Court’s application of the lodestar method in 
this context.  For the reasons discussed below, however, we must nevertheless vacate the 
fee award and remand the case to the District Court. 
B 
 When a court applies the lodestar method to award fees in a class action case that 
involves a fee-shifting statute, there is “a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar represents 
the ‘reasonable’ fee,” for class counsel’s work.  City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 
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557, 562 (1992) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 
478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)).  Any “upward adjustments of the lodestar figure are . . . 
permissible . . . only in certain ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’” circumstances, Del. Valley, 478 
U.S. at 565, typically involving “superior attorney performance,” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex 
rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010); see also William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class 
Actions § 15:50 (5th ed. 2011).  These circumstances include: (1) “where the method 
used in determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does not 
adequately measure the attorney’s true market value”; (2) “if the attorney’s performance 
includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally 
protracted”; or (3) where there was an “exceptional delay in the payment of fees . . . . 
particularly where the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense.”  Perdue, 559 U.S. at 
554-56.  If presented with a “rare” and “exceptional” case, a district court must tailor the 
method of enhancing the lodestar to that specific case.  See id.  For instance, if an 
attorney’s hourly rate is “determined by a formula that takes into account only a single 
factor (such as years since admission to the bar),” the district court may adjust the hourly 
rate “in accordance with specific proof linking the attorney’s ability to a prevailing 
market rate.”  Id. at 555.  
 The party requesting an enhancement to the lodestar carries the burden to show 
that a multiplier is necessary to reach a fair and reasonable fee award.  Id. at 553; City of 
Burlington, 505 U.S. at 562.  That party must produce “specific evidence on the record” 
supporting the enhancement.  Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 565 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Further, to ensure that the calculation “is objective and capable of 
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being reviewed on appeal,” a district court must provide detailed findings justifying any 
enhancement to the lodestar.  Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553, 557-59. 
 Here, the District Court offered no explanation for why the simple lodestar 
calculation would not adequately compensate class counsel, or why this case presented 
“rare” and “exceptional” circumstances needed to enhance the lodestar.  We see nothing 
in the record to suggest that class counsel provided the District Court the “specific 
evidence” required to justify the enhancement.3  Rather, it appears that the District Court 
simply adopted Dungee’s recommended 4.35 multiplier, understanding it to be the 
“average” multiplier used in the Third Circuit.4   In the absence of specific evidence from 
class counsel and detailed findings by the District Court justifying the use of any lodestar 
multiplier, let alone a multiplier of 4.35, we must vacate the $1,118,936.40 award and 
remand the case to the District Court.  On remand, the District Court should reassess 
                                              
3 Significantly, Dungee did not argue, either in her briefing or at oral argument 
before this Court, that the District Court’s use of a 4.35 multiplier was defensible.  
Dungee maintained instead that the overall award of approximately $1 million in fees 
was reasonable, in light of the total possible settlement amount.  
 
 4 We note that the District Court cited to only Bradburn Parent Teacher Store, Inc. 
v. 3M, 513 F. Supp. 2d 322, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2007), in support of its use of a multiplier in 
this case.  In Bradburn, a district court discussed multipliers in the context of performing 
a lodestar “cross-check” against a percentage-of-recovery award request; that court was 
not considering a request to enhance a fee award calculated under the lodestar method in 
the first instance.  Id.  In any event, the court cited 4.35 as the average multiplier 
approved by courts in common fund class actions between 2001 and 2003.  See id. (citing 
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 1221350, at *16 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004)).  
That figure is irrelevant to this case. 
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whether an enhancement to the lodestar calculation is appropriate in this case and, if so, it 
should provide factual findings supporting any multiplier used. 
III 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting 
$1,118.936.40 in attorneys’ fees, and the District Court’s order approving final settlement 
of this class action, insofar as the final settlement incorporated the $1,118.936.40 fee 
award, and we will remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
